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Lock ‘Em Up and Set Them Free?: How to Reconcile 
Tough-on-Crime Sentencing Policies with Justice 
Reinvestment in Maryland 
Daniel G. Solomon*∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States of America is the world leader in prison population,1 
an unsettling title that results in part from the tough-on-crime sentencing 
policies of the late 20th century.2 However, the modern approach to 
criminal justice views mass incarceration itself as a social crisis which 
may no longer best serve the needs of society.3 This outlook has America 
retreating from the criticized tough-on-crime policies.4  
 
∗. J.D. 2019, Washington University School of Law. 
1. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html (The U.S. incarcerates 
698 people for every 100,000 residents.). “Today, the incarcerated population is 4.5 times larger than 
in 1980, with approximately 2.2 million people in the United States behind bars, including 
individuals in Federal and State prisons as well as local jails.” THE WHITE HOUSE, ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2016), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.arch 
ives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/23/cea-report-economic-perspectives-incarceration-and-criminal-
justice. 
2. See Mark Osler & J. Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass 
Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 117, 124 (2014) (“The War on 
Drugs became its own prison-generating machine, producing incarceration rates that ‘defy gravity and 
continue to grow even as crime rates are dropping.’”) (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and 
Moral Costs of Mass Incarceration in African American Institutes, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 
(2004)); Steven Nauman, Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 
65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 882 (2013) (“[T]he United States suffers from a prison-overcrowding crisis of 
unprecedented proportions, primarily resulting from a spike in mandatory minimum sentencing that 
began in the mid-1980s.”); THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (“Changes in the severity of 
sentencing . . . which have led to longer sentences . . . have been the primary drivers of the 
incarceration boom.”). 
3. Jonathan Simon, Ending Mass Incarceration is a Moral Imperative, 26 FED. SENT’G R. 271, 
271 (2014) (“[P]rison is now seen for the first time in decades as itself a social problem, at least as 
serious as crime.”); see also James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 993, 995 (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration disproportionally affects America’s most 
disadvantaged groups). 
4. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS AND 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT POLICY ON CHARGING 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AND RECIDIVIST ENHANCEMENTS IN CERTAIN DRUG CASES 
(2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-depart 
ment-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-
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Coinciding with the precipitous increase in the prison population,5 
America has become a dramatically safer place to live.6 Despite this 
overall downward trend in nationwide crime, in Baltimore, Maryland, 
2017’s “most dangerous city” in America,7 historic violence has the city 
reeling.8 State and City officials are at a loss on how to solve the crisis.9  
 
drugcases.pdf (explaining that the Department of Justice will no longer seek available mandatory 
minimum sentences); see also Congress Shows Bipartisan Support Of Changing Mandatory 
Sentencing Law, FOX NEWS (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/01/05/congress-
shows-bipartisa 
n-support-changing-mandatory-sentencing-laws.html (“An unusual alliance of Tea Party enthusiasts 
and liberal leaders in Congress is pursuing major changes in the country’s mandatory sentencing 
laws.”).  
5. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (“Adjusting for population, the incarceration rate grew by 
more than 220 percent between 1980 and 2014.”). 
6. Id. (“[C]rime rates have fallen sharply; between 1980 and 2014 violent crime rates fell by 39 
percent and property crime rates fell by 52 percent.”). For a discussion of what caused the crime 
decline, see OLIVER ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, & JULIA BOWLING, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.pdf. 
7. Aamer Madhani, Baltimore is the Nation’s Most Dangerous City, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/19/homicides-toll-big-u-s-cities-2017/302763002/. 
8. See Kevin Rector & Jessica Anderson, After Violent Summer In Baltimore, Schools Prepare for 
Empty Seats and Mourning Kids, BALT. SUN (Sept. 3, 2017), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/Maryl 
and/crime/bs-md-ci-youth-violence-20170901-story.html (“After another summer of historic gun 
violence in the city, school officials are preparing for an emotional return on Tuesday, when empty 
seats will underscore a grim reality: Some students are now dead, some are recovering from gunshot 
wounds, and some are sitting in jail, accused of taking part in the mayhem.”); Pat Warren, Baltimore’s 
Rising Violence Getting Rising State Attention, CBS BALT. (Sept. 12, 2017), 
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/201 
7/09/12/baltimores-rising-violence-rising-state-attention-maryland-senate-panel-crime-murder-homici 
de/ (“State Sen. Nathaniel McFadden told lawmakers Tuesday that when ‘all hell breaks loose’ as it 
has [in Baltimore], ‘the whole state has a problem.’”); Josh Hicks, Hogan Promises ‘Truth in 
Sentencing’ Measure for Repeat Violent Offenders, WASH. POST (August 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/local/md-politics/hogan-promises-truth-in-sentencing-measure-for-repeat-violent-offenders/2017/08 
/29/3b2060b2-8cdf-11e7-91d5-ab4e4bb76a3a_story.html?utm_term=.3e68a766f1d1 (“Epidemic levels 
” of violence); Noah Weiland, At Rallies, Students With a Different View of Gun Violence: As Urban 
Reality, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/gun-rally-urban.html 
(“In cities such as Baltimore, the anguish of shootings feels different—the bloodshed comes not in 
isolated bursts of mass slaughter, but instead in a ceaseless rhythm, something that happens to friends 
and family, classmates and neighbors, in front yards and on playgrounds.”). 
9. Mike Hellgren, Baltimore Seeking Solutions Amid Record High Murder Rate, CBS BALT. (July 
7, 2017), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/07/07/baltimore-record-high-murder-rate/ (“The mayor 
wants tougher gun laws. The governor blames judges and prosecutors for lenient punishments, while 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/14
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In an attempt to combat the violence, in 2018, the Maryland General 
Assembly (“MGA”) invoked relics of the tough-on-crime sentencing era 
and passed S.B. 101,10 legislation that requires a 10-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for a second violent offense to be served in full, 
without the possibility of parole or having the sentence suspended.11  
S.B. 101 shortly follows the MGA’s enactment of the Justice 
Reinvestment Act (“JRA”) in 2016.12 The JRA solidified Maryland’s 
commitment to justice reinvestment, a forward-thinking approach in 
criminal justice reform which is premised on the idea that “accurate 
information on risk can inform decisions to reserve prison resources for 
high-risk offenders, while reducing recidivism of low-risk offenders by 
diverting them to less costly, community-based solutions.”13 Through 
strategies like reducing prison sentences, reclassifying offense types, 
expanding prison alternatives for lower-level offenders, revising 
mandatory minimum laws, and expanding earned time opportunities for 
inmates,14 justice reinvestment is capable of reducing prison enrollment 
 
the state’s attorney accuses him of finger pointing.”); Ovetta Wiggins, Md. Lawmakers Struggle for 
Ways to Address Crime in One of the Nation’s Most Violent Cities, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), 
https://ww 
w.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/md-lawmakers-struggle-for-ways-to-address-crime-in-one-of 
-the-nations-most-violent-cities/2018/03/24/6ca5e59e-289d-11e8-874b-d517e912f125_story.html?utm 
_term=.4354a917cc7f (“Maryland lawmakers arrived in Annapolis this year [2018] determined to pass 
a bill that would reduce the soaring rate of crime and violence in Baltimore. But deciding the best way 
to do that has proved painful and divisive, as lawmakers from across the political spectrum debate how 
best to try to save lives while weighing the potential harm of harsher criminal penalties.”). 
10. 2018 Md. Laws 804. 
11. Rachel Chason, Maryland Lawmakers Reject Wide-Ranging Crime Bill, Pass More Modest 
Measures, WASH. POST (April 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-
l 
awmakers-reject-wide-ranging-crime-bill-pass-more-modest-measures/2018/04/07/db35bd2e-39ee-11 
e8-9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html?utm_term=.897b0347f122; see 2018 Md. Laws 804, 807. The 
statute lists twenty-five crimes that are defined as a crime of violence. Id. at 805-06. 
12. 2016 Md. Laws 6239; see Michael Dresser, Hogan Signs Bill to Overhaul Maryland Criminal 
Justice System, BALT. SUN (May 19, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-
md-justice-reinvestment-20160518-story.html. 
13. Bridget Lowrie, Stop Asking Which Came First, the Jail or the Criminal - Start Reinvesting in 
Justice in Maryland, 47 U. BALT. L.F. 99, 109 (2017). 
14. MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, FINAL REPORT 5 (2015), available at http://goccp.maryland.gov/jrcc/documents/jrcc-
final 
-report.pdf. 
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and the costs of maintaining correctional facilities.15  
First, this Note chronicles Baltimore, Maryland’s recent surge in 
violence and introduces Maryland’s salve for the problem—a tough-on-
crime sentencing law that targets repeat violent offenders. The History 
section then discusses policy arguments for and against tough-on-crime 
sentencing policies. Next, the History section explores justice 
reinvestment and explains Maryland’s Justice Reinvestment Act. The Note 
concludes with an analysis supporting Maryland’s decision to enact S.B. 
101 and introduces a proposal for the implementation of additional justice 
reinvestment reform measures to offset the potential increase in prison 
enrollment from the new legislation. 
 
I. HISTORY 
 
A. Violence in Baltimore, Maryland 
 
Although the national crime rate is near the historic low,16 the murder 
rate in Baltimore, Maryland is at an all-time high.17 Baltimore’s surge in 
homicides can be traced contemporaneously to the riots of 2015.18 On 
 
15. See id. at 4. For example, 
[i]n 2011, policymakers in Georgia faced a projected eight-percent increase in the prison 
population over the next five years at a cost of $264 million. Rather than spend more taxpayer 
dollars on prisons, Georgia leaders looked for more cost-effective solutions. The state 
legislature unanimously passed a set of reforms that controlled prison growth through changes 
to drug and property offense statutes, and improved public safety by investing in local 
community supervision, sanctions, and services. Between 2012 and 2014 . . . the state crime 
rate has fallen three percent and the sentenced prison population has declined three percent, 
giving taxpayers better public safety at a lower cost. 
Id.  
16. MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIME TRENDS 1990-2016 3 (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publicca 
tions/Crime%20Trends%201990-2016.pdf (“[C]rime has largely fallen steadily, and now is about half 
what it once was . . . .”). 
17. Madhani, supra note 7. 
18. Jess Bidgood, The Numbers Behind Baltimore’s Record Year in Homicides, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 
15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/14/us/Baltimore-homicides-
record.html?mcubz= 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/14
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April 19, 2015, Freddie Gray, a twenty-five year old African-American 
male, died from a severe spinal injury sustained while riding in the back of 
a police van without a seatbelt.19 After Gray’s funeral on April 27, 2015, 
Baltimore exploded into riots and civil unrest,20 marking the beginning of 
unprecedented violence.21 By the end of 2015, Baltimore had 344 
homicides, a staggering 62.9% increase over 2014’s per capita rate.22 In 
2016, Baltimore had 318 homicides, resulting in the second-deadliest per 
capita rate in the city’s history, second only to 2015.23 Not to be outdone, 
in 2017, Baltimore had 342 homicides, again besting its own per capita 
record.24 All told, from 2015 to 2017, Baltimore had the highest per capita 
 
3 (“From January through mid-April, the city’s monthly homicide totals were near the same pace of 
recent years…May…was among its deadliest months in decades. For the rest of the year, Baltimore 
averaged 31 homicides a month.”). 
19. Peter Hermann & John Woodrow Cox, A Freddie Gray Primer: Who Was He, How Did He Die, 
Why is There So Much Anger?, WASH. POST (April 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/local/wp/2015/04/28/a-freddie-gray-primer-who-was-he-how-did-he-why-is-there-so-much-anger/?ut 
m_term=.5d28734d5cf8. 
20. Erik Ortiz, Freddie Gray: From Baltimore Arrests to Protests, a Timeline of the Case, NBC 
NEWS (May 1, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/timeline-freddie-gray-
case-arrest-protests-n351156; see also William J. Gorta, Baltimore Burns: Freddie Gray Protests Turn 
Violent, Prompting State of Emergency, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/Baltim 
ore-unrest/stones-hurled-cops-after-gray-funeral-gangs-unite-target-cops-n349186 (detailing Maryland 
’s declaration of a state of emergency as protestors threw cinder-blocks at police, looted businesses, 
and set vehicles on fire). 
21. See Bidgood, supra note 18.  
22. AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2015: A FINAL 
ANALYSIS 3 (APR. 20, 2016), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Cri 
me_in_2015_A_Final_Analysis.pdf (The per capita rate in 2015 was 55.2 murders per 100,000 
residents.). “In 2014, Baltimore had 211 homicides, which according to the Baltimore Police 
Department was the city’s second-lowest total since 1972.” Bidgood, supra note 18.  
23. AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2016: FINAL 
YEAR END DATA 3 (JUNE 6, 2017), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/350458878/Crime-
in-2016-Final-Year-End-Data#from_embed (The per capita rate in 2016 was 51.3 murders per 100,000 
residents.). 
24. AMES C. GRAWERT, JAMES CULLEN & VIENNA THOMPKINS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIME IN 2017: FINAL ANALYSIS 3 (JUNE 12, 2018), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fi 
les/analysis/Crime_in_2017_A_Final_Analysis.pdf(The per capita rate in 2017 was 55.4 murders per 
100,000 residents.); Baltimore Homicide Rate is on a Record High, Deadlier Than Detroit and 
Chicago, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/19/homicides-
toll-big-u-s-cities-2017/302763002/. 
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murder out of the thirty largest cities in America.25 The violent crime rate 
in Baltimore also increased dramatically by 19.2% in 2015,26 18.6% in 
2016,27 and 14.8% in 2017.28 In order to combat the overwhelming 
violence, in 2018, the MGA passed S.B. 101 which requires that a 10-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for a second violent offense be served in 
full, without the possibility of parole or having the sentence suspended.29 
Unsurprisingly, S.B. 101 has provoked passionate emotion from 
opponents and supporters alike.30 
 
 
B. Tough-on-Crime Sentencing Policy 
 
From 1984 to 1996, American criminal sentencing policy went through 
a period characterized as “tough-on-crime.”31 “Most policy initiatives 
during the tough on crime period sought to make sentences harsher and 
more certain.”32 Since their inception, tough-on-crime policies have 
provoked fervor on both sides of the aisle.  
Advocates hail the policies as a solution,33 while critics maintain that 
 
25. See supra notes 21-23. 
26. GRAWERT & CULLEN,supra note 22, at 2. 
27. GRAWERT & CULLEN, supra note 23, at 2. 
28. GRAWERT CULLEN & THOMPKINS, supra note 24, at 2. 
29. See Chason, supra note 11. 
30. Id. A policy director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland said that “[e]xpanded 
sentences — whether mandatory minimums or enhanced maximums — have never made us safer . . . 
They are regressive provisions that will not improve the lives of Marylanders.” Id. The Governor’s 
office countered that “Maryland must take action to target the repeat violent offenders who are 
terrorizing our communities.” Id. 
31. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 150 (2013) (“[M]ost 
jurisdictions enacted some or all of mandatory minimum sentence, truth-in-sentencing, ‘sexual 
predator,’ ‘career criminal,’ three-strikes, and [life without parole] laws.”); see also Susan Turner, 
Peter W. Greenwood, Terry Fain & James R. Chiesa, An Evaluation of the Federal Government’s 
Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants, 86 PRISON J. 364, 367 
(2006) (explaining that the wave of tough-on-crime policy enactment was in response to a 40% 
increase in violent crime from 1984 to 1992). 
32 . See Tonry, supra note 31, at 160. 
33. See James Wootton, Truth in Sentencing-Why States Should Make Violent Criminals Do Their 
Time, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 779, 780 (1995) (“Keeping violent criminals incarcerated for at least 
eighty-five percent of their sentences would be the quickest, surest route to safer streets, schools, and 
homes.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/14
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they are too severe and ineffective.34 Research shows that imposition of 
longer sentences can serve as a deterrent to criminals.35 Opponents counter 
that the theory of deterrence is outdated and is not supported by tangible 
evidence.36 Supporters of tough-on-crime policies also point to successful 
incapacitation of offenders as an achievement of longer sentences, because 
increasing the incarceration rate has been shown to reduce crime rates.37 In 
response, critics argue that longer sentences have little incapacitation 
effect because prisoners remain in jail at ages when they would have 
stopped offending.38 Academics also argue that incapacitation fails 
because it turns people into career criminals.39 
Critics of tough-on-crime policies point to swelling prison populations 
and the corollary increase in correctional costs as a problem exacerbated 
by such laws.40 Opponents further contend that when judges’ sentencing 
 
34. See Mark Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 
11 (1999) (“[M]andatory penalty laws . . . too often result in imposition of penalties that everyone 
involved believes to be unduly harsh.”); see also Susan Turner, Peter W. Greenwood, Elsa Chen & 
Terry Fain, The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, 
State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 79 (1999) (finding that in the early 
years of its implementation, ‘get tough’ legislation did not appear to cause a reduction in levels of 
reported violent crimes). 
35. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & David Rivers, Criminal Discount Factors and Deterrence (IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 9769), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2730969 (finding that harsher 
sentences work as a deterrent, but only up to the first few years in prison). 
36. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A 
Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 302 (2007) (concluding that the 
“theory of specific deterrence inherent in the politically popular and intuitively appealing view that 
harsher treatment of offenders dissuades them from further criminal behavior is thus not consistent 
with the preponderance of available evidence.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, The Truth about Mass 
Incarceration, NATIONAL REVIEW (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424059/mass-incarceratio 
n-prison-reform (arguing that deterrence fails because “we overestimate prospective criminals’ 
foresight and self-discipline.”).  
37. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison 
Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 348 (1996). 
38. Carl P. Schmertmann, Adansi Amankwaa, & Robert D. Long, Three Strikes and You’re Out: 
Demographic Analysis of Mandatory Prison Sentencing, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 445, 458-59 (1998). 
39. Bibas, supra note 36. 
40. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Proposals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth About 
Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 510 (2002) (explaining that determinate sentencing 
policies cause longer prison sentences and prison stays which in turn increase the cost of maintaining 
correctional facilities); Tonry, supra note 31, at 147 (“Mandatory minimum, three-strikes, and truth-in-
sentencing laws have greatly increased the lengths of prison terms and for that reason are a major 
cause of the fivefold increase in America's imprisonment rate between 1972 and 2007.”); see also 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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discretion is eliminated, it prevents sentencing adjustment that assures 
proportionality between the crime and punishment. 41 This results in 
unduly harsh sentences for some undeserving offenders. 
 
C. Justice Reinvestment 
 
Although the crime rate has remained near the historic low,42 prison 
populations43 and correctional costs continue to swell.44 Even with 
America’s continued exponential prison growth after the crime rate peaked 
in the early 1990’s, the strongest research shows that only one-quarter to 
one-third of the drop in crime can be attributed to this growth.45 Instead, 
research finds that the decrease in crime may be attributable to several 
other factors, including better policing, changing demographics, increased 
private security, and improved theft prevention technologies.46 Relying on 
new empirical data, states are embracing the notion that they can reduce 
the crime rate without increasing the prison population, thereby cutting 
tremendous costs from the state budget.47  
 
Ashley Gilpin, Note, The Impact of Mandatory Minimum and Truth-in-Sentencing Laws and Their 
Relation to English Sentencing Policies, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 91, 100-01 (2012) (citing longer 
prison terms as a direct cause for the increase in state budget spending on prison costs throughout the 
thirty years of sentencing reform from 1970 through 2001). 
41. See Shepherd, supra note 40, at 510. Proponents defend tough-on-crime policies by arguing that 
research demonstrates determinate sentencing policies reduce sentencing disparity amongst judges. 
James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: 
Before and after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271, 298-99 (1999).  
42. FRIEDMAN, GRAWERT & CULLEN, supra note 16, at 3. 
43. See Wagner, supra note 1. 
44. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 1 (“Real expenditures on the criminal justice system as a 
whole total over $270 billion, or $870 per capita and have grown by over 70 percent in the last two 
decades.”). 
45. See MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 3.  
46. Id.; see also Factors Contributing to the Crime Decline, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 11, 
2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2014/09/11/factors-contributing-to-
the-crime-decline (suggesting that waning crack cocaine demand, the improved economy, and less 
lead exposure are additional contributing factors to the nation’s crime decline). 
47. See MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 3-4.  
Consider Florida and New York: over the past 20 years, both states experienced massive and 
identical crime rate reductions of 54 percent. New York achieved that reduction while 
reducing its imprisonment rate by 24 percent, while Florida expanded its use of prison by 31 
percent—costing taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars a year. . .. In the last five years, 32 
states . . . reduced both their imprisonment and crime rates. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/14
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In 2006, the Pew Charitable Trust and the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
launched the Justice Reinvestment Initiative to help states reduce their 
swelling prison populations.48 Justice reinvestment is premised on the idea 
that “accurate information on risk can inform decisions to reserve prison 
resources for high-risk offenders, while reducing recidivism of low-risk 
offenders by diverting them to less costly, community-based solutions.”49 
Numerous states have already implemented justice reinvestment 
strategies,50 and, in 2015, Maryland followed suit by establishing the 
Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council (“Council”).51 Maryland 
tasked the Council with “develop[ing] a statewide framework of 
sentencing and corrections policies to further reduce the state’s 
incarcerated population, reduce spending on corrections, and reinvest in 
strategies to increase public safety and reduce recidivism . . ..”52 The 
 
Id.  
48. Nicole Lewis, Maryland Leads as Prison Populations Continue to Decline, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (May 18, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/18/maryland-leads-as-prison-
po 
pulations-continue-to-decline; see also SENTENCING PROJECT, ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: 
CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 2, available at http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uplo 
ads/2015/12/Ending-Mass-Incarceration-Charting-a-New-Justice-Reinvestment.pdf (“[A] revived, 
reoriented Justice Reinvestment effort could significantly reduce U.S. corrections populations and 
costs. . . .”). But see Michael Tonry, Making Peace, Not a Desert: Penal Reform Should Be About 
Values Not Justice Reinvestment, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 637, 637 (2011) (criticizing Justice 
Reinvestment as an “oblique[], . . . complicated proposal[] aiming simultaneously—and magically[]to 
save money, reduce offending, and reduce the numbers of people in confinement.”). 
49. See Lowrie, supra note 13, at 109. The key question at the heart of justice reinvestment is 
“[h]ow do we get taxpayers a better public safety return on their correctional dollars.” JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 4. Justice reinvestment strategies include 
reducing sentence lengths, reclassifying offense types, expanding prison alternatives for lower-level 
offenders, revising mandatory minimum laws, expanding earned time opportunities for inmates, and 
altering parole policy and practice to create more certainty and to reduce the length of stay. Id. at 5. 
50. The report states: 
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah . . . have 
implemented reforms to protect public safety and control corrections costs . . . by revis[ing] 
their sentencing and corrections policies to focus state prison beds on violent and career 
offenders and then reinvest[ing] a portion of the savings from averted prison growth into 
more cost-effective strategies to reduce recidivism. 
Id. at 4. 
51. Lowrie, supra note 13, at 111-12. 
52. MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at Executive Summary.  
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Council proposed recommendations53 which, if implemented, projected to 
reduce Maryland’s prison population by 3,930 inmates over the next 10 
years. This 14% reduction could avert $247 million in corrections 
spending.54  
In May 2016, Governor Hogan signed the groundbreaking Justice 
Reinvestment Act,55 adopting many of the Council’s recommendations.56 
Relying on justice reinvestment principles, the JRA aimed to reduce 
Maryland’s prison population,57 and use the savings to provide for more 
effective treatment to offenders, before, during, and after incarceration.58 
Highlights of the JRA include decreasing the maximum penalties for 
convictions on drug possession and distribution charges,59 repealing 
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenses,60 eliminating 
delays in administrative parole for some nonviolent offenders,61 and 
establishing graduated sanctions short of re-imprisonment for technical 
violators of supervised release.62 In an effort to target the most disruptive 
 
53. Id. at 13. The Council’s recommendations aimed to focus prison beds on serious violent 
offenders, strengthen probation and parole supervision, improve and enhance release and reentry 
practices, support local correctional institutions, and ensure oversight and accountability. Id. 
54. Id. at 24. 
55. Ovetta Wiggins, How Maryland Came to Repeal Mandatory Minimums for Drug 
Offenders, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/how-
maryla 
nd-came-to-repeal-mandatory-minimums-for-drug-offenders/2016/06/01/4961c7c4-2124-11e6-8690-
f14ca9de2972_story.html (“No state has gone as far as Maryland in recent memory . . . .“). 
56. Governor Larry Hogan Signs 144 Bills into Law, MARYLAND.GOV: OFFICE OF GOVERNOR 
LARRY HOGAN (May 19, 2016), http://governor.maryland.gov/2016/05/19/governor-larry-hogan-
signs-144-bills-into-law/; See Dresser, Hogan supra note 12. 
57. Maryland is already reaping the benefit of the Justice Reinvestment Act—the Vera Institute of 
Justice announced that Maryland led the nation with a 9.6% drop in prison inmates in 2017. Michael 
Dresser, Maryland Tops States in Decline of Prison Population, Report Shows, BALT. SUN (May 18, 
2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-prison-population-20180518-
story 
.html#. 
58. See Dresser, supra note 12.  
59. Justice Reinvestment Act, 2016 Md. Laws 6239, 6373-74 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 5-601 (West 2017)) (changing the law to imprisonment up to twelve months for a first 
conviction, imprisonment up to eighteen months for a second or third conviction, and imprisonment up 
to twenty-four months for a fourth or subsequent conviction). 
60. Id. at 6377-83 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-607, 5-608, 5-609, 5-609.1 (West 
2017)). 
61. Id. at 6355-60 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. §§ 7-205, 7-301.1 (West 2017)). 
62. Id. at 6352 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 6-121 (West 2017). See also id. at 
6365 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-401(d) (West 2017)); id. at 6409-10 (codified at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/14
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offenders, the JRA also increased the maximum penalty for second-degree 
murder63 and child abuse resulting in death.64 Researchers projected that 
implementation of the JRA in Maryland would save at least $80.5 million 
in correctional spending and reduce the prison population by nearly 1,200 
beds over the next ten years.65  
 
II. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
 
Since 2015, Baltimore, Maryland has experienced untenable levels of 
violence on neighborhood streets.66 Everyone agrees that the violence 
must end but exactly what brings down the crime rate is an oft-debated 
and divisive topic.67 Various explanations have been offered: some experts 
cite active measures like smarter policing and expanding the police force 
while others cite natural changes in societal demographics like aging 
population and lower unemployment rates which work independently to 
reduce crime.68 In truth, any theory or study is met with a confluence of 
extraneous factors that prevent an accurate determination or conclusion as 
to which variable, or variables, bring down the crime rate. For example, 
studies have reached contradictory conclusions on how much, if at all, 
incarceration reduces crime.69 The bottom line is, it is way more 
 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-224(d) (West 2017)) (establishing that for a technical violation of 
parole or probation an individual may serve no more than fifteen days for a first violation, thirty days 
for a second violation and forty-five days for a third violation). Additional highlights include 
eliminating jail time for driving on a suspended license, allowing geriatric parole at an earlier age, and 
raising the value of stolen items that makes theft a felony while also decreasing the length of 
imprisonment for theft. Id. at 6387, 6407, 6436-37. 
63. Id. at 6372 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204(b)) (increasing the penalty from 
thirty to forty years). 
64. Id. at 6373 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-601(b)(2) (imposing imprisonment not 
exceeding life if the abuse results in the death of a child under the age of thirteen years). 
65. Wiggins, supra note 55. 
66. See supra notes 22-24. 
67. See ROEDER, EISEN, & BOWLING, supra note 6, at 3 (“Why has crime fallen? . . . Social 
scientists and policy experts have searched for answers. . .. Most likely, there is no one cause for such 
widespread, dramatic change. Many factors are responsible.”). 
68. Id.  
69. Compare Levitt, supra note 37, at 348 (finding that “increased prison populations appear to 
substantially reduce crime”), with ROEDER, EISEN, & BOWLING, supra note 6, at 4 (“Increased 
incarceration has had little effect on the drop in violent crime in the past 24 years.”).  
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complicated than the talking points.70  
Looking beyond the numbers, incapacitation of repeat violent offenders 
by removing them from society and limiting their ability to commit 
crimes, is an intuitively sensible measure.71 When an individual makes the 
repeated choice to violate the fragile constructs of society, disrupting 
civilized life with cruel acts that ruin the lives of others, the neighborhood 
is safer with that individual behind bars. Therefore, Maryland made the 
right, nonetheless difficult, decision to enact S.B. 101. 
However, the effectiveness of longer, harsher sentences do have their 
limits. Research shows that the incapacitation effect of longer sentences 
wears off over time because prisoners remain in jail at ages when they 
would have stopped offending.72 And while longer sentences do have 
some deterrent effect, they are concentrated in the first few years.73 In light 
of these considerations, the limits placed on S.B. 101, setting the 
mandatory minimum sentence for repeat violent offenders at 10-years, is a 
sensible compromise between achieving Maryland’s goals with narrowly 
tailored means.  
No doubt this measure alone will not curb violent crime in Baltimore. It 
will take the establishment of programs that work to improve economic 
opportunities in low-income neighborhoods, a modernization of effective 
 
70 . See Inimai M. Chettiar, The Many Causes of America’s Decline in Crime, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-decline-
in-crime/385364/ (arguing that “the enormous growth in imprisonment only had a limited impact [on 
the drop in the crime rate]” while also conceding that “[w]e do not know with precision what caused 
the crime decline.”). 
71. See Joseph Hartzler, A Fork in the Road – Build More Prisons or Develop New Strategies to 
Deal with Offenders – Keynote Address, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285, 290 (1999) (“[T]here really is not an 
intelligent alternative to incarcerating violent criminals.”); see also Leon Neyfakh, OK, So Who 
Gets  to  Go Free? ,  SLATE (Mar.  4 ,  2015),  
ht tp: / /www.slate .com/art ic les/news_and_poli t ics /cr im  
e/2015/03/prison_reform_releasing_only_nonviolent_offenders_won_t_get_you_ver
y_far .html (“[P]risons exist for a reason—to remove violent criminals from the streets and to punish 
them for the violence they’ve committed.”). On the other hand, using incarceration as a punishment for 
nonviolent, non-serious crimes, imposing imprisonment for violations of technical conditions of 
supervised release, jailing low-risk defendants who are waiting for their trials to begin, and imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent crimes are intuitively insensible measures and should be 
the focus of America’s criminal justice system reform. See Chettiar supra, note 70. This note, 
therefore, only supports harsher penalties for repeat violent offenders. 
72. See Schmertmann, supra note 38. 
73. See S.K., supra note 35. 
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policing practices, and an expansion of treatment and rehabilitation 
programs that improve the health of communities to reduce people’s 
inclination towards crime.74 Nevertheless, tougher sentences are a 
worthwhile start. Violent crime is committed by a small, disruptive 
segment of the population,75 and removing this small portion of the 
population will make Baltimore a safer place to live. 
Imposing longer sentences for repeat violent offenders and eliminating 
their parole eligibility will likely increase the prison population over 
time.76 Thus, on its face, S.B. 101 is seemingly antithetical to Maryland’s 
recent efforts to reduce prison enrollment and correctional costs through 
justice reinvestment. But, the issue of mass incarceration should not sway 
the debate over whether to lock up legitimately violent and harmful 
members of society. Rather, it should propel policy to undo the harshness 
of penalties for crimes which are no longer viewed as particularly 
injurious to the public welfare.77  
Upon closer examination, tougher sentences fit neatly into the purpose 
of Maryland’s justice reinvestment reform which aims to “reserve prison 
resources for high-risk offenders, while reducing recidivism of low-risk 
offenders by diverting them to less costly, community-based solutions.”78 
Justice reinvestment seeks to maximize the allocation of prison resources 
for violent offenders who deserve to occupy a prison bed more than their 
 
74. See generally ROEDER supra, note 67. In conjunction with tougher sentencing laws, Maryland 
also passed legislation requiring the Governor to appropriate $3,600,000 in the annual State budget for 
Baltimore City to be used provide grants to community-based organizations to implement Safe Streets 
Initiatives, an anti-violence program, in Baltimore City. 2018 Md. Laws 838. 
75. Senator Bobby Zirkin, sponsor of S.B. 101 and chair of the Maryland Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee commented “[t]hat bill (S.B. 101) was for the worst of the worst and it was 
not a large number of individuals.” See Dresser, supra note 57. 
76. See Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/crimin 
al-justice-facts/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018)(reporting that half of the 222% growth in the state prison 
population between 1980 and 2010 was due to an increase of time served in prison for all offenses). 
77. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Inimai Chettiar, 39% of Prisoners Should Not Be in Prison, 
TIME (December 9, 2016), http://time.com/4596081/incarceration-report/ (finding that 
“approximately 39% of the nationwide prison population (576,000 people) is behind bars with 
little public safety rationale” including “25% of prisoners (364,000 people), almost all 
nonviolent, lower-level offenders, [who] would be better served by alternatives to incarceration 
such as treatment, community service, or probation.”). 
78. See Lowrie, supra note 13, at 109.  
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nonviolent counterpart.79 As justice reinvestment reduces the number of 
beds for nonviolent offenders, shifting a portion of those beds to violent 
offenders is a natural corollary. Violent offenders make up approximately 
65% of all inmates in Maryland prisons.80 While this ratio of violent to 
nonviolent offenders is a more efficient utilization of prison beds than the 
national average in state prisons, 54%,81 Maryland has the potential to use 
prison resources on violent offenders with greater efficiency.  
To offset the potential prison population increase from S.B. 101, 
Maryland should double down on their commitment to justice 
reinvestment and adopt additional measures to further reduce prison 
enrollment and correctional costs. While the JRA took significant steps 
towards fixing Maryland’s penal system, key alterations to the Council’s 
proposed recommendations in the final version of the JRA resulted in a 
decrease of 2,730 beds and $167 million from the projections.82 Where did 
all the savings go? 
As evidenced by the sheer difference in impact projections from the 
Council’s recommendations to the final version of the JRA, much more 
 
79. See MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 13 (listing “focus prison 
beds on serious and violent offenders” as one of the five goals of the Council’s recommendations for 
implementing justice reinvestment). V. Glenn Fueston Jr., executive director of the Governor’s Office 
of Crime Control and Prevention remarked:  
One of the key goals of [justice reinvestment] is to focus enforcement efforts on individuals 
committing violent crimes while providing second chances and rehabilitation for nonviolent 
offenders . . . The legislation passed this session focuses on getting repeat violent offenders 
off of our streets by ensuring that they serve their full sentences. 
See Dresser, supra note 57. The MGA also already demonstrated a willingness to come down harsher 
on the most disruptive criminals by increasing the maximum penalty for second-degree murder and 
abuse of a child that results in death in the JRA. See 2016 Md. Laws 6239, 6244 (codified at MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (West 2017)).. 
80. CONNIE UTADA & FELICITY ROSE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, MARYLAND DATA ANALYSIS 
PART 1: PRISON DRIVERS 69 (2015), available at 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/jrcc/documents/presentation-20150729-prison-drivers.pdf.  
81. E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2016 1 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas eds., 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf. 
82. MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 2. If adopted, the Council’s 
consensus recommendations were projected to reduce Maryland’s prison population by 3,930 inmates 
over the next 10 years, averting $247 million in corrections spending. Id. In the final version of the 
JRA, researchers projected that its implementation would save only $80.5 million in correctional 
spending and reduce the prison population by 1,200 beds over the next ten years. See 
Wiggins, supra note 55. 
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can be done. First, although the JRA established graduated, capped 
sanctions short of reimprisonment for violators of parole and probation,83 a 
major step in reducing the prison population,84 a clause in the JRA may 
have eliminated any potential gain. The JRA included a safety valve for 
judges to impose periods of incarceration beyond the legislative caps for 
parole violations if the inmate posed a risk to public safety.85 This safety 
valve gives judges ample room to disregard the revised revocation 
sanctions for probation and parole and will likely result in judges 
maintaining their old revocation-sentencing habits, enabling them to send 
undeserving technical violators back to prison to serve part, or all, of their 
remaining sentence. Maryland should eliminate this ‘trap door’ and 
prevent judges from imposing unjust sentences on mere technical 
violators. 
Second, the Council found that although the percentage of offenders 
released to parole increased in the last ten years, it remains under 40%.86 
When offenders are eligible for parole, they serve an average of nine 
months past their eligibility date.87 As a solution, the Council 
recommended creating an administrative parole process for nonviolent, 
parole-eligible offenders.88 The Council intended that this administrative 
 
83. See 2016 Md. Laws 6239, 6364-71 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-401 (West 
2017)) (“On finding that adhering to the limits would create a risk to public safety, a victim, or a 
witness . . .  the commissioner may: direct imposition of a longer period of imprisonment than 
provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-224 (West 2017). 
84. See UTADA, supra note 80, at 69. In Maryland, prisoners serving sentences for revocation from 
probation, parole, and mandatory supervision take up 37% of all prison beds. Id. This figure is 
unsurprising considering the 29% increase in average sentence length for probation revocation over the 
last decade, id. at 29, a trend that has not shown signs of abatement—58% of all prison admissions in 
2014 were on supervision before entering prison. Id. at 11. Strikingly, for possession with intent to 
distribute narcotics and distribution of narcotics, the average sentence of offenders sent to prison for a 
violation of probation was longer than those sentenced directly to prison. See JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 
COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 28. 
85. 2016 Md. Laws 6239, 6411-12 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-223(e)(3) (West 
2017)). 
86. MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 9.  
87. UTADA, supra note 80, at 51. This nine-month average delay in release from parole costs the 
system almost 1,600 beds. Id. Moreover, nonviolent parolees are released at around 40% of their 
aggregate sentence despite reaching eligibility at 25%. Id.  
88. MD. JUSTICE REINV. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 21. This process is “based on 
the results of a validated risk and needs assessment administered at the time of commitment to 
developed individualized case plans that are achievable by the parole eligibility date.” Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
SOLOMON NOTE  8/7/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 59:243 
 
 
parole process apply to all nonviolent offenders in prison.89 Instead, the 
JRA limited the administrative parole process to some, but not all, low-
risk inmates,90 further contributing to the reduction of savings in the final 
projection. Maryland should conform the JRA with the Council’s 
proposed recommendations and apply the administrative parole process to 
all nonviolent offenders. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To offset the potential increase in prison population from recently 
enacted S.B. 101, Maryland should double-down on their recent justice 
reinvestment reform. While the two measures seem at odds with each 
other, straddling opposite ends of the criminal justice ideological 
spectrum, upon closer examination, the measures will work in tandem to 
achieve dual, complimentary aims—ensuring the societal removal of 
individuals who make the repeated choice to commit violent crimes while 
simultaneously reducing prison time for nonviolent offenders who may be 
better dealt with through alternative programs. 
Over the last quarter-century, America has become a much safer place 
to live.91 Yet, Baltimore, Maryland has not enjoyed the benefits of this 
crime decline; rather, the homicide rate is at an all-time high.92 Maryland 
must do more to address this crisis, and S.B. 101 is a worthwhile start to 
making the neighborhoods of Baltimore a safer place to live. 
 
 
89. Id.  
90. 2016 Md. Laws 6239, 6356-57 (codified at MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERV. § 7-301(e) (West 
2017)). The JRA excluded inmates serving time for their third possession with intent to distribute, the 
number one crime at admission from the administrative parole process. Id. see also JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 28. Instead, the JRA required them to 
serve one-half of their sentence before becoming parole eligible, id., a requirement that equates these 
inmates with violent offenders. See MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-301(c)(1)(i) (West 2017). 
Maryland should also eliminate this provision and re-equate these offenders to other nonviolent 
offenders who are eligible for parole after serving 25% of their sentence. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. 
SERVS. § 7-301(a) (West 2017) 
91. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 6. 
92. Madhani, supra note 7. 
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